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Summary
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council, acting at U.S.
urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving Iraq a final opportunity to “comply with its
the disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences.”  During January and
February 2003, the U.S. military buildup in the Persian Gulf continued, and analysts
speculated that mid-March seemed the most likely time for U.S. forces to launch a
war.  President Bush, other top U.S. officials, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair
have repeatedly indicated that Iraq has little time left to offer full cooperation with
U.N. weapons inspectors.  However, leaders of France, Germany, Russia, and China,
are urging that the inspections process be allowed more time.  The Administration
asserts that Iraq is in defiance of 17 Security Council resolutions requiring that it
fully declare and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  Skeptics,
including many foreign critics, maintain that the Administration is exaggerating the
Iraqi threat.  
In October 2002, Congress authorized the President to use the armed forces of
the United States to defend U.S. national security against the threat posed by Iraq and
to enforce all relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq (P.L. 107-243).  Some
Members of Congress have expressed dissatisfaction with the level of Administration
consultation on Iraq and suggested that the Administration should provide more
information on why Iraq poses an immediate threat requiring early military action.
Administration officials maintain that they have consulted regularly and have
compelling information on Iraqi noncompliance that cannot be released.
Analysts and officials are concerned about instability and ethnic fragmentation
in Iraq after any war.  U.S. planners are reportedly planning for an occupation of the
country that could last two years or longer.  Whether the overthrow of Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein will lead to democratization in Iraq and the wider Middle East or
promote instability and an intensification of anti-U.S. attitudes is an issue in debate.
The extent to which an Iraqi conflict would create a substantial humanitarian crisis,
including refugee flows and civilian deaths, will likely depend on the length of the
conflict and whether it involves fighting in urban areas.
Constitutional issues concerning a possible war with Iraq were largely resolved
by the enactment of P.L. 107-243, the October authorization.  International legal
issues remain, however, with respect to launching a pre-emptive war against Iraq if
there is no new Security Council resolution authorizing such a war.  Estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq vary widely, depending in part on assessments of the likely scale
of the fighting and the length of any occupation.  If  war leads to a spike in the price
of oil, economic growth could slow, but long-term estimates of the economic
consequences of a war are hampered by uncertainties over its scale and duration.
This CRS report summarizes the current situation and U.S. policy with respect
to the confrontation with Iraq, and reviews a number of war-related issues.  See the
CRS web site [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html] for related
products, which are highlighted throughout this report.  This report also provides
links to other sources of information and is updated approximately once a week.
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Most Recent Developments
By March 4, U.S. forces either in or on their way to the Middle East had reached
approximately 235,000.  Administration military strategy received a setback on
March 1, when the Turkish parliament refused to approve acceptance of 62,000 U.S.
troops on Turkish soil, which would have created a northern front for Iraq in the
event of war; another vote on the issue is possible.
On February 26, President Bush outlined his vision for a post-war, democratic
Iraq.  He said that a democratic Iraq would inspire reform throughout the Middle East
and open the door to settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.  Administration officials
continued to dispute estimates of the cost of occupying post-war Iraq and how many
troops might be needed.  Army chief General Shinseki stood by his estimate of
“several hundred thousand”troops for the occupation, a number that Deputy Secretary
of Defense Wolfowitz called “wildly off the mark.”
Chief of the U.N. inspections program, Hans Blix, issued a report on February
28 stating that Iraq’s disarmament had been thus far “very limited,” but he added
later that day that Iraq’s beginning destruction of its Al-Samoud 2 missiles was “very
significant.”  Administration officials countered that elimination of the missiles was
a modest and insufficient step by Baghdad.
Arab states remained divided over calling for Hussein to leave Iraq and seek
asylum.  Four states called for his departure, but the Arab League refused to do so,
contending that it was inappropriate to call for a leader to step down from power
under threat of war.
The United States and Britain considered next steps on their U.N. resolution
condemning Iraq’s failure to cooperate in disarmament efforts.  On March 3,
Administration officials said that they might seek a vote in the Security Council
during the week of March 10, but only if they had secured votes for the resolution’s
passage.
French foreign minister de Villepin objected to what he viewed as the
Administration’s evolving position.  U.N. Resolution 1441 spoke of disarmament,
but, he contended, the Administration had now moved regime change, democracy,
and political change throughout the Middle East onto the agenda, issues that, due to
their implications for dramatic transformation of the region, required U.N. debate and
approval.  Both France and Russia indicated that their governments might veto the
U.S.-UK resolution.
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1 “Vice President Speaks at VFW 103d National Convention,” August 26, 2002; and “Vice
President Honors Veterans of Korean War,” August 29, 2002.  Available on the White
House web site at [http://www.whitehouse.gov] under “News.”
2 “President’s Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly,” September 12, 2002.
Available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
Figure 1. Iraq in the Middle East
For a chronology of Iraq-related events since October 2002, see CRS Report
RL31667, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and Scheduled Events.
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Overview
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Background.   Bu s h
Administration concerns about Iraq’s
alleged weapons of mass destruction
programs intensified after the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.
President Bush named Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as the “axis of evil”
nations in his January 2002 State of
the Union address.  Vice President
Cheney, in two August 2002
speeches, accused  Iraqi leader
Saddam Hussein of seeking weapons
of mass destruction to dominate the
Middle East and threaten U.S. oil
supplies.1  These speeches fueled
speculation that the United States
might act unilaterally against Iraq.
However, in a September 12, 2002
speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Bush pledged to work
with the U.N. Security Council to meet the “common challenge” posed by Iraq.2
H.J.Res. 114, which became law (P.L. 107-243) on October 16, authorized the use
of force against Iraq, and endorsed the President’s efforts to obtain prompt Security
Council action to ensure Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions.  On November 8,
2002, the Security Council, acting at U.S. urging, adopted Resolution 1441, giving
Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply with the disarmament obligations imposed under
previous resolutions, or face “serious consequences.”
Recent Developments.  During January and February 2003, the U.S. military
buildup in the Persian Gulf intensified, as analysts speculated that mid-March seemed
a likely time for an attack to be launched.  (See below, Military Situation.)  Officials
maintain that it would be possible to attack later, even in the extreme heat of summer,
but military experts observe that conditions for fighting a war would be far better in
CRS-3
3 “President’s Remarks on Iraq,” January 14, 2003  [http://www.whitehouse.gov].
4  BBC News, January 19, 2003.
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the cooler months before May. Statements by President Bush, Secretary of State
Colin Powell, and other top officials during January and  February expressed a high
degree of dissatisfaction over Iraq’s compliance with Security Council disarmament
demands. The President said on January 14, that “time is running out” for Iraq to
disarm, adding that he was “sick and tired” of its “games and deceptions.”3  National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said on January 19, that “we are at the verge of
an important set of decisions.”4  On January 26, 2003,  Secretary of State Powell told
the World Economic Forum, meeting in Davos, Switzerland, that “multilateralism
cannot be an excuse for inaction” and that the United States “continues to reserve our
sovereign right to take military action against Iraq alone or in a coalition of the
willing.”  Powell also told the Davos meeting that there are “clear ties” between Iraq
and terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda. 
President Bush presented a sweeping condemnation of Iraq in his State of the
Union Address on January 28, 2003.  “With nuclear arms or a full arsenal of
chemical and biological weapons,” the President warned, “Saddam Hussein could
resume his ambitions of conquest in the Middle East and create deadly havoc in the
region.”  The President told members of the armed forces that “some crucial hours
may lie ahead.”  Alleging that Iraq “aids and protects” Al Qaeda, the President also
condemned what he said was Iraq’s “utter contempt” for the United Nations and the
world.  On February 5, 2003, as discussed below under Weapons of Mass
Destruction Issues,  Secretary of State Powell detailed to the United Nations
Security Council what he described as Iraq’s “web of lies” in denying that it has
weapons of mass destruction programs.  President Bush, in a February 6 statement,
predicted that Saddam would likely play a last minute “game of deception,” but
warned, “The game is over.”  The President affirmed on February 18 that he would
continue to work for a United Nations Security Council resolution that would
broaden support for possible action against Iraq but told reporters “it’s not necessary
as far as I’m concerned.”  The President added, “Saddam Hussein is a threat to
America.  And we will deal with him.”  
On February 26, President Bush gave a major address on Iraq.  He said that the
end of Hussein’s regime would “deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron ....
And other regimes will be given a  clear warning that support for terror will not be
tolerated.” He returned to an earlier Administration theme in declaring that post-
Hussein Iraq would be turned into a democracy, which would inspire reform in other
Middle Eastern states.  Specialists challenged his assertion that transforming Iraq into
a democracy was a credible option.  They cited the strong political, ethnic, and
religious differences among its population and questioned whether the United States
could mount the resolve for a process of democratization that might take years to
accomplish.5
Despite the resolve of U.S. officials, international support for an early armed
confrontation remains limited.  President Jacques Chirac of France has been a leading
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7 “Disarmament, Not Strife, Is France’s Goal, Insists de Villepin,” Financial Times,
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9 “Support for a War with Iraq Grows After Bush’s Speech,” Washington Post, February 2,
2003.
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11 “Poll Shows Most Want War Delay,” New York Times, February 14, 2003.
critic of the U.S. approach, and maintains that he is not convinced by the evidence
presented by Secretary of State Powell.  On February 10, at a press conference in
Paris with President Putin of Russia, Chirac said “nothing today justifies war.”
Speaking of weapons of mass destruction, Chirac added “I have no evidence that
these weapons exist in Iraq.”6  France, Germany, and Russia advocate a strengthened
inspections regime rather than an early armed conflict with Iraq, and China takes a
similar position.  France, Russia, and China have veto power at the United Nations
Security Council.  (See below, Diplomatic Situation.) French foreign minister de
Villepin criticized the manner in which the Bush Administration had built its case
against Iraq.  He said that U.N. Resolution 1441 addressed only disarmament, but
that now the Administration was seeking to move forward with creating a democracy
in Iraq and spreading democracy throughout an unstable region with a limited history
of representative governments.  Such dramatic change, he said, required discussion
and approval by the United Nations.7
U.S. officials  point out that a number of other countries support the U.S.
demand for immediate Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions on disarmament.
Many foreign observers point out,  however, that U.N. inspectors have yet to find a
“smoking gun” proving that Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction
programs.  U.S. officials and others maintain that this was never the goal of the
inspections. In their view, the purpose of inspections is to verify  whether or not Iraq
has disarmed in compliance with past U.N. resolutions.  Iraq has not pro-actively
cooperated with the inspections process, they argue, and consequently there has been
no such verification.8
In mid-January 2003, polls showed that a majority of Americans wanted the
support of allies before the United States launched a war against Iraq.  The polls
shifted on this point after the State of the Union message, with a majority coming to
favor a war even without explicit U.N. approval.9  Polls shifted further in the
Administration’s direction following Secretary Powell’s February 5 presentation to
the Security Council.10  However, on February 14, 2003, the New York Times
reported that a majority again wanted to give U.N. weapons inspectors more time to
complete their work.11  A Washington Post-ABC News poll, reported on February 25,
showed a majority willing to wait for a U.N. resolution supporting military action
against Iraq, while overall support for military action stood at 63%, down from 66%
two weeks earlier. In a Washington Post poll completed March 2, support slipped
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further, to 59%, with growing ambivalence evident in the nature of support.12  Many
remain opposed to war.  Forty-one Nobel laureates in science and economics released
a declaration opposing war on January 27, and former President Jimmy Carter said
on January 31 that President Bush has “not made a case for a pre-emptive military
strike against Iraq.”13  (For congressional views, see below, Congressional Action.)
Press reports noted that U.S. policy on Iraq was leading to a rise in anti-
Americanism overseas, particularly in western Europe, where polls show strong
opposition to a war with Iraq.14  Large public demonstrations against a possible war
with Iraq occurred in the United States and in cities overseas on the weekend of
January 19-20, 2003.  Demonstrations in western European cities and New York on
the weekend of February 15-16 were widely described as “massive.” In the two days
prior to the Turkish parliament’s March 1 refusal to allow U.S. forces to enter the
country, large demonstrations against war occurred in major cities.  Polls showed that
approximately 90% of the Turkish population opposed war.15
Options for the Future.  Analysts believe it likely that the United States will
soon move against Iraq, with or without the endorsement of the U.N. Security
Council.  Some nonetheless urge that policymakers delay a war as long as possible
and accede to wishes of Council members who want the arms inspection process to
be given more time.  In their view, going to war without Security Council permission
would be harmful to international institutions while threatening stability in the
Middle East and perhaps beyond.  Others argue that further delay would reward
Iraq’s alleged delaying tactics and undermine U.S. credibility.  They also maintain
that there would be serious economic, military, and political costs to leaving a large
U.S. military force in the Middle East indefinitely.  It may be that dramatic evidence
of Iraqi non-compliance will emerge in the near future, and that this will bring
stronger international backing for a war.  Another view is that if U.S. action against
Iraq appears imminent, other countries, such as Russia and France, will hesitate at
fracturing the international community and further alienating Washington through
continued opposition.  Some expect they may eventually offer support or at least
abstain on any U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing force.  Others argue that
France, at least, has gone too far in opposing force for this to be an option until U.N.
inspections have continued for months into the future.
According to reports, some governments in the Middle East region, despite their
denials, have used back channels to urge Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and other
Iraqi leaders to resign from office, possibly going into exile under some sort of
guarantee of immunity from prosecution. If a new regime agreed to carry through
with disarmament, this eventuality could avert war altogether.16  However, many
analysts, noting Saddam’s past intransigence, doubt that he would make such a move.
CRS-6
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18 “World Unites to Warn Iraq to Meet March 1 Deadline,” Reuters, February 24, 2003.
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Some observers are hoping for a military coup that will sweep Saddam from power,
but others suggest that the Iraqi president’s control of the armed forces is too firm to
permit such an event.
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Developments at the United Nations.  The U.N. Security Council is the
stage for the diplomatic endgame to resolve the crisis over Iraq’s disarmament.  On
February 24, 2003,  the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain tabled a new
resolution, which American officials have characterized as a test of the Council’s
relevance and credibility.  The succinct resolution, if passed, would state that the
Council “Decides that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity afforded to it in
resolution 1441” to disarm.17  The three allies aim to convince six nonpermanent
Council members to support the resolution and then challenge France, Russia, or
China to veto it.  France and Russia are competing to influence the rotating members’
votes in order to avoid having to exercise a veto.  Secretary of State Powell has said
that he expects the U.N. to decide on the resolution soon after March 7.18   If defeat
of the resolution appears likely, it may be withdrawn.  The United States and Britain
reserve the right to take military action against Iraq without the resolution. 
France, Germany, and Russia have circulated an informal memorandum,
supported by China, arguing that “the conditions for using force against Iraq are not
fulfilled” and calling for reinforced inspections, with inspectors reporting every three
weeks and presenting an overall assessment in four months.19  Since these three
governments maintain that a new resolution is not needed, their ideas were not
presented as a  counter-resolution to that backed by the U.S., UK, and Spain.  
Canada is trying to bridge the gap between the two sides by circulating an
informal compromise plan to give Iraq a March 28 deadline to show compliance with
key disarmament demands or “all necessary means” to force it to comply could be
used.20  Several non-permanent Council members find the plan appealing, but the
United States, Britain, and Spain have rejected it.
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 The Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) Hans Blix and the Director General of International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohammed ElBaradei have reported to the Security
Council several times and will do so again on March 7. (For details, see below,
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues.) They are assessing Iraq’s compliance with
U.N. Security Council resolutions that require it to disarm, especially Resolution
1441 of  November 8, 2002, which gave Iraq a “final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations” and set up an enhanced inspection regime to bring about
the “full and verified completion of the disarmament process.” It also warned Iraq
that it would face “serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
obligations.”21  Inspections began on November 27.  Iraq has begun complying with
Blix’s February 21 order to hand over “for verifiable destruction” Al-Samoud 2
missiles and its components.  Blix has said that destruction of the missiles would be
“a significant piece of real disarmament.”   Iraq also has promised to submit a report
on VX nerve gas and anthrax. 
Foreign Reactions.  International public misgivings about the possibility of
war continue to grow – as evidenced by massive anti-war protests around the world
on February 15-16.  A European Union summit held in their wake on February 17
was aimed at bridging internal EU differences between countries resisting the U.S.
approach and those supporting it.  The summit communique reiterated that the
objective is the “full and effective disarmament” of Iraq.  It declared that “force
should be used only as a last resort” but put the burden on Baghdad to end the crisis
by complying with the Security Council’s demands.22  The EU said that inspectors
must be given time and resources, but “inspections cannot continue indefinitely in
the absence of full Iraqi cooperation.”  Thirteen acceding and candidate countries
aligned themselves with the summit conclusions. On February 18-19, the Security
Council gave more than 60 non-Council members an opportunity to express their
views; most favored continuing inspections.  A conference of the 116-member Non-
Aligned Movement in Kuala Lumpur on February 24 provided another forum for a
succession of leaders to endorse inspections and oppose war.
Unease also prevails in the Middle East, where many leaders are concerned that
war would increase regional instability and terrorism and produce other undesired
results, such as the disintegration of Iraq or the demise of their regimes.  On February
17, Arab foreign ministers condemned unilateral action against Iraq, called on
Baghdad to abide by U.N. resolutions, and called on Arab states “to refrain from
offering any kind of assistance or facilities for any military action that leads to the
threat of Iraq’s security, safety, and territorial integrity.”23  However, Arab leaders did
not repeat that statement at the end of a divisive  summit on March 1.  They urged
“complete rejection of any aggression on Iraq” and more time for inspections. 
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Peace Initiatives.  There is considerable diplomatic activity seeking to avert
a war.  The Pope is actively trying to contribute to disarmament and peace.  He has
met world leaders, including U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, Iraqi Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz, and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and is sending a personal
emissary to meet President Bush.   The Pope has called for a day of prayer and fasting
for peace on March 5, Ash Wednesday.  South Africa, which eliminated its nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons under U.N. supervision, sent a team of
disarmament experts to Iraq on February 23 to assist it with the mechanics of
cooperating with weapons inspections. 
Concrete proposals have emerged from the region.  The President of the United
Arab Emirates proposed that the Iraqi leadership give up power and leave Iraq within
two weeks in exchange for a binding guarantee that it would not be subject to legal
action. The Arab League and the U.N. would then supervise the situation in Iraq for
an interim period until the return of normality.24  Bahrain,  Kuwait, and Qatar have
agreed with the proposal.  Meanwhile, Iran has called for a U.N.-supervised
referendum to allow the Iraqi people to bring about a peaceful power transition.  It
also urged “national reconciliation” between the Iraqi opposition and the Iraqi
regime.
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The United States continues a very large build-up of military forces in the
Persian Gulf region and other locations within operational range of Iraq.  The
Department of Defense (DOD) has released limited official information on these
deployments; but press leaks have been extensive, allowing a fairly good picture of
the troop movements underway.  The statistics provided, unless otherwise noted,  are
not confirmed by DOD and should be considered approximate.
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Figure 2.  Iraq
The number of U.S. personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf region (both ashore
and afloat) is reportedly nearing 225,000, and may total about 250,000 by mid-
March.  DOD has announced that, as of February 26, 2003, there are more than
168,000 National Guard and Reservists from all services now called to active duty,
an increase of about 18,000 in one week.25  DOD has not indicated which of these
personnel are being deployed to the Persian Gulf region, and how many will be
“backfilling” positions of active duty personnel in the United States, Europe, and
elsewhere. In addition to U.S. deployments, Britain is dispatching an armor Battle
Group, a naval Task Force, and Royal Air Force units, totaling about 47,000
personnel.26
Secretary Rumsfeld has activated the Civil Reserve Aircraft Fleet (CRAF) to
transport troops to the Persian Gulf region.  Under CRAF’s Phase One, 22 airlines
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(continued...)
will provide up to 47 passenger airliners and crews for DOD use.  An additional 31
cargo aircraft are also available under CRAF  Phase One, but they will not be used
at this time.
 The United States has personnel and materiel deployed in the Persian Gulf
states of Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.  With
the possible exception of Kuwait, it is still not clear what level of
cooperation/participation can be expected from these nations if the United Nations
Security Council does not pass another resolution specifically authorizing the use of
force against Iraq.  
Outside  the Persian Gulf region, only the United Kingdom, Australia, Denmark,
and Poland have offered military contributions if the Security Council does not act
further.  The White House press office announced in November 2002, that the United
States had contacted 50 nations regarding cooperation in military operations against
Iraq, but declined to provide specific details on responses.27  After protracted debate,
NATO’s Defense Policy Committee approved Turkey’s request for military
assistance and directed NATO HQ to begin planning for the deployment of airborne
early-warning aircraft, air defense missiles, and chemical-biological defensive
equipment.  Germany and Belgium reversed their early opposition to this effort, and
France’s anticipated opposition was obviated by acting within the Defense Policy
Committee of which France is not a member. Both the Netherlands and Germany
have indicated they are deploying Patriot air defense missiles to Turkey.  The U.S.
CENTCOM commander has downplayed the impact of the Turkish parliament’s
rejection of a proposal for basing U.S. troops in Turkey, stating that the use of
Turkish territory is not necessary for a successful operation.  Lack of basing rights
in Turkey will, however, complicate efforts to secure the northern Iraqi oilfields and
ensure the stability of Kurdish-held areas.  U.S. officials are hoping for a
parliamentary reconsideration of the proposal and are exploring whether it might be
easier to obtain overflight rather than basing rights.  (See also Burden Sharing
Issues.)
News reports maintain that the Bush Administration, through National Security
Presidential Directive (NSPD) 17 and the National Strategy for Combating Weapons
of Mass Destruction,  has endorsed the possible first use of nuclear weapons if U.S.
or allied forces are attacked with chemical or biological weapons, or to attack
underground bunkers that are deemed invulnerable to conventional munitions.
Though shown to the press, NSPD 17 remains classified and Administration
spokesmen have declined comment on its content.  The National Strategy document
does not refer to nuclear weapons specifically but rather refers to a “resort to all
options.”  Some analysts suspect that press leaks on a nuclear option are an attempt
to intimidate Iraq rather than a genuine threat.  Critics are concerned that the
Administration is lowering the nuclear threshold and discarding long-held U.S.
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The Bush Administration has characterized the regime of Saddam Hussein in
Iraq as a grave potential threat to the United States and to peace and security in the
Middle East region.  The Administration maintains that Iraq has active weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) programs that could be used to attain Saddam Hussein’s
long-term goal of dominating the Middle East.  These weapons, according to the
Administration, could be used by Iraq directly against the United States, or they could
be transferred to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.  The Administration says that the
United States cannot wait until Iraq makes further progress on WMD to confront
Iraq, since Iraq would then be stronger and the United States would have fewer
military and diplomatic options.
The Administration asserts that Iraq is in breach of 17  U.N. Security Council
resolutions –  including Resolution 1441 of November 8, 2002  –  that, among other
requirements, mandate that Iraq fully declare and eliminate its WMD  programs.
President  Bush has stated that Iraq must immediately  and pro-actively cooperate
with a new U.N. disarmament effort, or the United States will lead a coalition to
disarm it.  President Bush reiterated that position after a February 14, 2003 Security
Council meeting in which most Council members expressed the view that U.N.
weapons inspections should be given more time to produce additional results, and
following large anti-war protests in many cities worldwide on February 15.  The
Washington Post reported on February 24, 2003 that senior U.S. officials have begun
telling their foreign counterparts that a decision to go to war with Iraq has already
been made.29  However, it is possible that U.S. officials are conveying that message
as part of an attempt to persuade wavering governments to support a U.S. draft
Security Council resolution authorizing force.   The Administration wants a vote on
the new resolution the week of March 10, and press reports say the Administration
has not firmly decided on a course of action if the vote fails, although U.S.
deployments and Administration statements indicate the United States will begin
building a coalition to go to war with Iraq shortly after such a vote.     
Policy Debate.  Several press accounts indicate that there have been divisions
within the Administration on Iraq policy.  Secretary of State Powell had been said to
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typify those in the Administration who believe that a long term program of unfettered
weapons inspections could succeed in containing the WMD threat from Iraq.30  He
reportedly was key in convincing President Bush to work through the United Nations
to give Iraq a final opportunity to disarm unilaterally.  However, since late January
2003,  Secretary Powell has been insisting that Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully with
the  latest weapons inspections indicates that inspections would not succeed in
disarming Iraq and that war will likely be required, with or without U.N.
authorization.  The Secretary is reportedly  highly critical in private of U.S. allies,
particularly France, that oppose  war with Iraq.  Polls show that a majority of
Americans look to Secretary Powell as a trusted Administration spokesman on the
Iraq crisis, and Powell worked with British officials to draft a new U.N. resolution
declaring Iraq in further breach of U.N. requirements to disarm.  
Press reports suggest that Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, among others, have consistently been skeptical that inspections can
significantly reduce the long-term threat from Iraq and reportedly have long been in
favor of military action against Iraq.  These and other U.S. officials reportedly believe
that overthrowing Saddam Hussein would pave the way for democracy not only in
Iraq but in the broader Middle East, and reduce support for terrorism.  In a speech
before the American Enterprise Institute on February 26, 2003, President Bush said
that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by the United States could lead to the spread
of democracy in the Middle East and a settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.
Those who favor military action believe that Iraq is concealing active WMD
programs and will eventually try to use WMD to harm the United States unless it is
completely disarmed.  Skeptics, including many foreign critics, assert that the
Administration is exaggerating the WMD threat from Iraq, and that launching an
attack might goad Baghdad into using WMD as a last resort.  
In January 2003, the Administration revived assertions it had made periodically
since the September 11, 2001 attacks that Iraq supports and has ties to the Al Qaeda
organization, among other terrorist groups.  According to the Administration, Iraq
has provided technical assistance in the past to Al Qaeda to help it construct chemical
weapons, and senior Al Qaeda activists have contacts with the Baghdad regime.  A
faction based in northern Iraq and believed linked to Al Qaeda, called the Ansar al-
Islam, is in contact with the Iraqi regime, according to the Administration.  President
Bush said in his 2003 State of the Union message that “Evidence from intelligence
sources, secret communications, and statements from people now in custody, reveal
that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda.”
However, press reports in early February 2003 said that this view was not uniform
within the intelligence community and that some in the intelligence community
discount any Iraq-Al Qaeda tie as only a possibility.
Another view is that  there may have been occasional tactical cooperation
between some in Al Qaeda and some Iraq intelligence agents.31  Others are said to
believe that there might have been some cooperation when Osama bin Laden was
CRS-13
based in Sudan in the early 1990s, but that any Iraq-Al Qaeda cooperation trailed off
later on, after bin Laden was expelled from Sudan in 1996 and went to Afghanistan.
Bin Laden issued a statement of solidarity with the Iraqi people on February 12,
exhorting them to resist any U.S. attack.  Secretary of State Powell cited the tape as
evidence of an alliance between the Iraqi regime and Al Qaeda, although bin Laden
was highly critical of Saddam Hussein in the statement, calling his Baath Party
regime “socialist,” and therefore “infidel.”  
Regime Change Goal.  The Bush Administration’s decision to confront Iraq
under a U.N. umbrella has led the Administration to mute its prior declarations that
the goal of U.S. policy is to change Iraq’s regime.  The purpose of downplaying this
goal may have been to blunt criticism from U.S. allies and other countries that note
that regime change is not required by any U.N. resolution on Iraq.   However, in
practice, the United States draws little separation between regime change and
disarmament; the Administration believes that a friendly government in Baghdad
would be required to ensure complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD.  In recent weeks,
the Administration has again raised regime change as a specific goal of a U.S.-led
war  and has implied that only a change of regime could forestall a U.S.-led
offensive.  Press reports in October 2002 said that the Administration is recruiting
an Iraqi opposition force of up to 5,000, using equipment and training funds ($92
million remaining) authorized by  the Iraq Liberation Act (P.L. 105-338, October 31,
1998).  This force, now undergoing training at an air base in Hungary, could support
a U.S. attack or work on its own to destabilize Saddam Hussein.  The Administration
is working with Iraqi exile groups to determine future policies and priorities in a
post-Saddam Iraq as part of its “Future of Iraq Project.”
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Congressional Action
Jeremy M. Sharp, 7-8687
(Last updated March 4, 2003)
Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Congress has played an active role
in supporting U.S. foreign policy objectives to contain Iraq and force it into
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions. Congress has restricted aid and
trade in goods to some countries found to be in violation of international sanctions
against Iraq. Congress has also called for the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime
from power and the establishment of a democratic Iraqi state in its place.  In 1991,
Congress authorized the President to use force against Iraq to expel Iraqi forces from
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Kuwait in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (P.L.
102-1).
On October 16, 2002, the President signed H.J.Res. 114 into law as P.L. 107-
243, the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”
The resolution authorized the President to use the armed forces to defend the national
security of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all
relevant U.N. resolutions regarding Iraq.  The resolution conferred broad authority
on the President to use force and required the President to make periodic reports to
Congress “on matters relevant to this joint resolution.”  The resolution expressed
congressional “support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and
decisive action by the Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all
relevant Security Council resolutions.
Congress has continued to play a role in formulating U.S. policy in Iraq even
after the passage of H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-243). The range of congressional action
falls roughly into four broad categories:
! Many Members who voted in favor of the resolution have offered
strong support for President Bush’s attempts to force Iraq into
compliance with U.N. resolutions.
! Other lawmakers, including some who supported the resolution,
have commended the Administration for applying pressure on
Saddam Hussein’s regime but have called on the Administration to
be more forthcoming with plans for the future of Iraq and more
committed to achieving the broadest possible international coalition
of allied countries.
! Still others, including some Members who voted in favor of H.J.Res.
114, have questioned the urgency of dealing with Iraq, particularly
in light of developments in North Korea and Iran.
! Finally, many Members who voted against H.J.Res. 114 (P.L. 107-
243) have continued to look for ways to forestall the use of force
against Iraq, in part by proposing alternative resolutions that call for
a more comprehensive inspections process. In one instance, several
Members initiated a lawsuit to curtail the President’s ability to
authorize the use of force. 
Congressional Oversight.  Some lawmakers have been dissatisfied with the
level of consultation and communication between Congress and the White House
since the signing of P.L. 107-243. In January 2003, Senate Minority Leader Tom
Daschle stated that the Bush Administration has failed to report to Congress on its
diplomatic efforts and military preparations within 60 days, as he said was required
by P.L. 107-243.32 In response, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said he did
not believe that the resolution required a written report, and that his verbal briefings
should suffice.  Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Powell have
given several closed-door briefings to Members of Congress. After the briefings,
some Members have commented that the Administration has evidence on Iraq’s
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weapons programs “that can change people’s minds.”33  Other lawmakers have
commented that  the evidence against Iraq is less compelling, characterizing it as a
“building block in making the case for going forward.”34 Some Members have asked
that the Administration give weapons inspectors in Iraq more time, and several later
commented that the Administration should do a better job of explaining why Iraq
poses an immediate threat to the United States.35  On January 30, 2003, at a Senate
Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Iraq,  Senator Joseph Biden urged the Bush
Administration to “make it easier” for international allies to join the United States in
pressing Iraq to comply with United Nations resolutions. 
Secretary of State Colin Powell’s February 5 briefing before the United Nations
Security Council received a positive response on Capitol Hill, though some Members
were still divided over the best approach to deal with Iraq. After the briefing,
Representative Nancy Pelosi stated that “the question is whether war now is the only
way to rid Iraq of these deadly weapons.  I do not believe it is.  Before going to war,
we must exhaust all alternatives, such as the continuation of inspections, diplomacy
and the leverage provided by the threat of military action.”36 Others, including
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, were more supportive of the use of force,
saying that “the evidence proves that Saddam Hussein has a loaded gun pointed at
the civilized world.  It is time to take that loaded gun away from this evil tyrant.”37
In another hearing with Secretary Powell before the House International Relations
Committee on February 12, 2003, Chairman Henry Hyde challenged the United
Nations to deal effectively with the Iraq issue, saying that “in Iraq, the world’s fifty-
eight-year experiment with collective security is being put to the supreme test. If Iraq
is permitted to defy twelve years of United Nations resolutions demanding its
disarmament, then that fifty-eight-year experiment in collective security will be, for
all intents and purposes, over.”38
Legislation.  Since the start of the 108th Congress, lawmakers have drafted
several resolutions relating to the current confrontation with Iraq. Some Members
opposed to a war in Iraq have proposed bills to repeal the “Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.”39 Other lawmakers have drafted
legislation that would require the President to meet additional criteria such as
allowing additional time for weapons inspections and passing a second U.N. Security
Council resolution before authorizing the use of force against Iraq.40 Most observers
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believe that these proposals will likely be put aside in their respective committees,
as there is an insufficient amount of support in Congress to place further
requirements on the Administration’s handling of the Iraq issue. 
The Washington Post has reported that some Members of Congress are
considering measures, such as trade sanctions, that would retaliate against France and
Germany for their stance on Iraq. U.S. lawmakers, angry over French and German
opposition to the Administration’s Iraq policies, are considering retaliatory gestures
such as trade sanctions against French wine and bottled water. Some Members
reportedly also support proposals to move many U.S. troops based in Germany to
other locations.41
In a legal challenge to President Bush’s authority to declare war under P.L. 107-
243, six House Members initiated a lawsuit against the Bush Administration to try
to prevent the President from launching an invasion of Iraq without an explicit
declaration of war from Congress. In a statement from Representative John Conyers,
a plaintiff in the lawsuit, the Congressman remarked that “the president is not a
king...he does not have the power to wage war against another country absent a
declaration of war from Congress.”42 However, on February 24, 2003, a federal judge
in Boston refused to issue a temporary restraining order against the Administration,
calling a potential war in Iraq a political rather than a legal issue, which was “beyond
the authority of this court to resolve.”43
On February 27, 2003, Representative Curt Weldon introduced H.Res. 118 in
the House of Representatives calling for the United Nations to establish an
international criminal tribunal for the purpose of indicting, prosecuting, and
imprisoning Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials who are responsible for crimes
against humanity, genocide, and other criminal violations of international law.
Options for the Future.  In the event of a war with Iraq, a supplemental
appropriations bill to provide funding is widely anticipated.  Following a war or
significant “regime change” in Iraq, the United States will likely seek to influence
future internal political and economic developments in that country. Congress may
be asked to provide funding for a range of foreign assistance programs that would
facilitate U.S. long-range objectives in Iraq.  The extent and cost of U.S. programs
would depend on the post-war scenario. (See below, Cost Issues.)  The
Administration may ask Congress to appropriate new funds for refugees and/or to
support coalition partners in the Middle East, which may suffer economically in the
event of regional instability. Congress may also be asked to authorize a program of
assistance specific to Iraq along the lines of the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992
(P.L. 102-511), which authorized aid to the former Soviet Union, or the Afghanistan
Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). In considering aid levels, Congress
will have to weigh Iraq-related aid against other budget priorities.
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Issues for Congress
Weapons of Mass Destruction Issues
Sharon Squassoni, 7-7745
(Last updated March 4, 2003)
Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, along with its long-
range missile development and alleged support for terrorism, are the justifications put
forward for the use of U.S. military forces.  Iraq had varying capabilities in all
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) before the 1991 Gulf War.44  The inspections
conducted between 1991 and 1998 destroyed or otherwise eliminated much of those
capabilities, but certain aspects of the programs that were unresolved in 1998 remain
so today.  Current inspections seek to resolve those ambiguities as well as uncover
what Iraq might have produced since 1998.45
Nuclear Program.  Iraq had a well-financed and broad-based nuclear weapons
program before the 1991 Gulf War, but did not produce enough fissile material for
a weapon.  In 1998, questions remained about nuclear weapons designs and
centrifuge development, external assistance, and whether the nuclear program truly
had been abandoned.  On February 14, 2003, IAEA Director General Mohamed
ElBaradei again  reported that inspectors have found no signs of a revived nuclear
weapons program.  The IAEA is still examining the alleged procurement of uranium
from Niger (which Iraq denies) and has asked Iraq to explain the technical
specifications for its high-strength aluminum tubes, which the United States and UK
believe were intended for use in uranium enrichment, but which the IAEA believes
have a plausible use in conventional rockets.  In addition, the IAEA is investigating
allegations of Iraq’s attempts to procure magnets and high-speed balancing machines
for a possible clandestine uranium enrichment program. 
Biological and Chemical Programs.  Iraq produced and weaponized
anthrax, aflatoxin and botulinum.  Although UNSCOM destroyed facilities,
production equipment, and growth media, it never accepted Iraq’s declaration as “a
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full account of Iraq’s BW program.”46  Iraq had a significant chemical weapons
program, producing blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and
non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin).  From 1991 to 1998, inspectors
destroyed 38,500 munitions, 480,000 liters of chemical agents and 1.8 million liters
of precursor chemicals.  Nonetheless, the fate of about 31,600 chemical munitions,
500 mustard gas bombs, and 4,000 tons of chemical precursors is still unknown, as
are Iraq’s capabilities to produce VX agent.  In 1995, Iraq admitted it had produced
4 tons of VX agent, but UNSCOM inspectors believed it had imported enough
precursor chemicals to produce 200 tons.  Iraqi officials provided documents on VX
agent to Blix and ElBaradei in Baghdad in February 2003, but again, there appears
to be no new information.  Blix reported that Iraq had offered suggestions for proving
the destruction of anthrax and VX precursors but that experts are not hopeful it will
be possible to prove that specific quantities were destroyed. 
Missile Program.  Iraq had a robust missile force and missile production
capabilities prior to the Gulf War, which was largely destroyed during that war and
in inspections from 1991 to 1998.  About 130 Soviet-supplied Scud missiles
remained after the war and inspectors accounted for all but two.  Iraq is permitted to
produce missiles with ranges shorter than 150 kilometers and has made progress in
producing Ababil and Samoud missiles of permitted ranges.  UNMOVIC missile
experts concluded that the Al-Samoud-2 missiles exceeded the permitted range and
UNMOVIC Chairman Blix notified Iraq that it must begin, by March 1, to destroy
the missiles as well as the SA-2 engines it imported for them.  Iraq agreed, and
destruction began under U.N. supervision on March 1.  As of March 4, nineteen
missiles have been destroyed, of perhaps more than 100.  UNMOVIC experts are still
considering whether the solid-fueled Al Fatah is a proscribed system but concluded
that Iraq’s missile test stand would not be recommended for destruction.
Inspections Status.  The U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission (UNMOVIC) and the IAEA have conducted over 750 inspections at 550
sites since November 2002.  A few new details have been uncovered through
inspections: the discovery in mid-January of empty chemical weapons shells not
previously declared; the unearthing in late February of two complete R-400 aerial
bombs at a site where Iraq unilaterally destroyed BW-filled aerial bombs; and the
discovery of 2000 pages of undeclared documents on uranium enrichment in a private
home.  Some destruction has taken place, including ten mustard gas shells left over
from inspections prior to 1998, and, notably, of new Al-Samoud-2 missiles beginning
on March 1.  Inspections should benefit from overflights of U-2 and Mirage IV
aircraft, which began in late February.   Progress on private interviews with scientists
has been mixed.  UNMOVIC so far has requested interviews with 28 individuals but
has only been able to interview five privately since early February.  The IAEA, on the
other hand, has conducted more than 9 private interviews in that time, mostly with
scientists connected to the gas centrifuge uranium enrichment program.  
Chairman Blix provided his report to the Security Council on February 28 in
advance of his March 7 scheduled briefing.  Blix highlighted several examples of
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Iraq’s cooperation on process, including the following: helicopter and surveillance
overflights; the two Iraqi commissions created to help UNMOVIC find documents
and proscribed items; provision of lists of personnel to interview; and procedures to
determine the disposition of anthrax and VX agent.  On substance, Blix noted that
there was a little new information in the December 7 declaration, that Iraqis helped
find the R-400 bombs, that Al-Samoud-2 missiles had been destroyed, and that
WMD-related activities had been prohibited by presidential decree.  Nonetheless, he
noted that “Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed
items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items.  The results
in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far.”47
Key Issues.  Some key issues to consider with respect to Iraq’s weapons of
mass destruction follow.
! What constitutes evidence of noncompliance?  To some,
noncompliance is equated with anything less than full cooperation
(i.e., unless compliance is proven, Iraq is noncompliant); to others,
there must be proof that Iraq is producing weapons of mass
destruction.
! What are the risks of continuing inspections?  To some, continuing
inspections gives Iraq more time to produce weapons of mass
destruction; to others, continuing inspections makes it more likely
that any covert programs will be uncovered.
! If inspections uncover signs of Iraqi WMD activity, is this a sign of
the failure or the success of inspections?
! Can coercive inspections ever be effective?  To some, only
cooperative inspections provide full assurances, while to others,
inspections provide an invaluable source of information that cannot
be gained from other means. 
! What is the best means of preventing the transfer of WMD
technologies or capabilities from Iraq to terrorists?  To some,
military force is the best way quickly and irrevocably to disarm Iraq
of its WMD capabilities to forestall such an action; to others,
military action could unintentionally create an environment
conducive to terrorist acquisition of WMD-related items. 
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Post-War Iraq
Kenneth Katzman, 7-7612
(Last updated March 4, 2003)
The same U.S. concerns about fragmentation and instability in a post-Saddam
Iraq that surfaced in prior administrations are present in the current debate over Iraq
policy.  One of the considerations cited by the George H.W. Bush Administration for
ending the 1991 Gulf war before ousting Saddam was that a post-Saddam Iraq could
dissolve into chaos.  It was feared that the ruling Sunni Muslims, the majority but
under-represented Shiites, and the Kurds would divide Iraq into warring ethnic and
tribal factions, opening Iraq to influence from neighboring Iran, Turkey, and Syria.
Because of the complexities of planning for a post-war Iraq, and the potential for
major inter-ethnic and factional feuding if Saddam falls, some observers believe that
the President George W. Bush Administration would prefer that Saddam Hussein be
replaced by a military or Baath Party figure who is not necessarily committed to
democracy but would comply with applicable U.N. resolutions.  Administration
statements, however, continue to express a strong commitment to democratizing Iraq.
Current Planning Efforts.  The Administration is planning for a post-
Saddam regime.  The Administration asserts that, if it takes military action and ousts
the government of Saddam Hussein, it will do what is necessary to bring about a
stable, democratic successor regime that complies with all applicable U.N.
resolutions.  Senior State Department and  Defense Department officials testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11, 2003 that there
would likely be at least a 2-year period before governance of Iraq could be transferred
from the U.S. military to an Iraqi administration.48  Some analysts speculated that the
transition might last considerably longer. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General
Eric Shinseki, told the Senate Armed Services Committee  on February 24 that as
many as 200,000 U.S. troops might be needed for a postwar occupation, although
other Administration officials have disputed the Shinseki assessment. 
A press report on February 21 indicated that a prominent American civilian
would likely be named to head an interim regime in Iraq and direct the reconstruction
effort.49  During the interim period, the United States would eliminate remaining
WMD, eliminate terrorist cells in Iraq, begin economic reconstruction, and purge
Baath Party leaders.  Iraq’s oil industry would also be rebuilt and upgraded.  Some
earlier reports indicated that some military planners would prefer that the United
Nations and U.S. allies play a major role in governing post-war Iraq on an interim
basis.  In September 2002, the Congressional Budget Office estimated that U.S.
occupation force levels would range between 75,000 and 200,000 personnel, at a cost
of $1 billion to $4 billion per month.  (See below, Cost Issues.)
The exiled Iraqi opposition, including those groups most closely associated with
the United States, generally opposes a major role for U.S. officials in running a post-
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war Iraqi government, asserting that Iraqis are sufficiently competent and unified to
rebuild Iraq after a war with the United States.  The opposition groups that have been
active over the past few years, such as the Iraqi National Congress, believe that they
are entitled to govern post-Saddam Iraq, and fear that the Administration might hand
power to those who have been part of the current regime. For now, the
Administration has rebuffed the opposition and decided not to back a “provisional
government,” composed of Iraqi oppositionists, that would presumably take power
after Saddam is overthrown. Nonetheless, the opposition met in northern Iraq in late
February 2003, with a White House envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad attending,  to plan their
involvement in a post-Saddam regime.  On February 11, Iraqi exile opposition
leaders reiterated their strong opposition to the installation of a U.S. military
governor in post-war Iraq50 and, at the northern Iraq meeting and against U.S.
urgings, the opposition named a six-man council that is to prepare for a transition
government if and when Saddam Hussein is ousted.  
As part of the post-war planning process, the U.S. State Department is
reportedly running a $5 million “Future of Iraq” project in which Iraqi exiles are
meeting in working groups to address issues that will confront a successor
government.51  The working groups in phase one of the project have discussed (1)
transitional justice; (2) public finance; (3) public and media outreach; (4) democratic
principles; (5) water, agriculture, and the environment; (6) health and human
services; and (7) economy and infrastructure.  Phase two, which began in late 2002,
includes working groups on (8) education; (9) refugees, internally-displaced persons,
and migration policy; (10) foreign and national security policy; (11) defense
institutions and policy; (12) free media; (13) civil society capacity-building; (14) anti-
corruption measures; (15) oil and energy; (16) preserving Iraq’s cultural heritage; and
(17) local government.   
Reconstruction/Humanitarian Effects.   On January 20, 2003, President
Bush ordered the formation of post-war planning office called the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, within the Department of  Defense. 
The office is in the process of establishing links with U.N. agencies and non-
governmental organizations that will play a role in post-war Iraq and forge links to
counterpart organizations in countries that participate in U.S. military action against
Iraq.
It is widely assumed that Iraq’s vast oil reserves, believed second only to those
of Saudi Arabia, would be used to fund reconstruction.  Presidential spokesman Ari
Fleischer said on February 18, 2003, referring to Iraq’s oil reserves, that Iraq has “a
variety of means... to shoulder much of the burden for [its] own reconstruction.”
However, many observers believe that an Iraqi regime on the verge of defeat could
destroy its own oil fields.  Iraq set Kuwait’s oil fields afire before withdrawing from
there in 1991.  The Administration reportedly is planning to try to secure Iraq’s oil
fields early in any offensive against Iraq to prevent this from happening.  A related
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issue is long-term development of Iraq’s oil industry, and which foreign energy firms,
if any, might receive preference for contracts to explore Iraq’s vast reserves.  Russia,
China, and others are said to fear that the United States will seek to develop Iraq’s
oil industry with minimal participation of firms from other countries.  Some press
reports suggest the Administration is planning to exert such control,52 although some
observers speculate that the Administration is seeking to create such an impression
in order to persuade Russia that it has an interest in participating in a coalition against
Iraq. 
 
War Crimes Trials.  Analysts have debated whether Saddam Hussein and his
associates should be prosecuted for war crimes.  The Administration reportedly has
reached a consensus that, if there is U.S. military action that overthrows Saddam, he
and his inner circle would be tried in Iraq.53  The Administration is gathering data for
a potential trial of Saddam and 12 of his associates, but at the same time, some
officials have indicated that Saddam and others might be allowed a safe haven if he
leaves Iraq voluntarily before a war.  The New York Times reports that U.S.
intelligence has catalogued and categorized about 2,000 members of the Iraqi elite,
segmenting them into those that might be tried as war criminals, those that might
quickly defect to the U.S. side in the event of war, and those that already could be
considered opposed to Saddam or whose expertise would be crucial to running post-
war Iraq.54
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In November 2002, the U.S. government reportedly contacted the governments
of 50 countries with specific requests for assistance in a war with Iraq.  According
to Bush Administration officials, 26 countries have offered help of one kind or
another; others also intend to support the war effort but, for domestic political
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reasons, prefer not to publicize their contributions.55  Nevertheless, it appears
unlikely that a coalition comparable to that of Desert Storm in 1991 will arise.  
Political and Military Factors.  On the international political front, analysts
contend that it is important for the United States to enlist allies in order to
demonstrate that it is not acting unilaterally – that its decision to use force to disarm
Iraq has been endorsed by a broad global coalition.  In most cases, foreign decisions
to participate or cooperate likely will be predicated upon the results of U.N. arms
inspections and further actions by the U.N. Security Council.  Although the political
leaders of some Islamic countries are reportedly sympathetic to the Bush
Administration’s aims, they must consider hostility to U.S. actions among their
populations.  Analysts have suggested that some countries have sided with the United
States out of mixed motives; former U.S. ambassador to NATO Robert Hunter
characterized the nations backing U.S. policy as “a coalition of the convinced, the
concerned, and the co-opted.”56
From a strictly military standpoint, active allied participation may not be critical.
NATO invoked Article 5 (mutual defense) shortly after the September 11, 2001
attacks against the United States, but during the subsequent war in Afghanistan, the
United States initially relied mainly on its own military resources, accepting only
small contingents of special forces from a handful of other countries.  Allied combat
and peacekeeping forces arrived in larger numbers only after the Taliban had been
defeated.  Analysts speculate that the Administration chose to “go it alone” because
the unique nature of U.S. strategy, which entailed special forces ground units locating
and then calling in immediate air strikes against enemy targets, necessitated the
utmost speed in command and communications.57  An opposing view is that the
United States lost an opportunity in Afghanistan to lay the political groundwork for
an allied coalition in the conflict against terrorism.  During Operation Allied Force
in Kosovo in 1999, some U.S. policy-makers complained that the requirement for
allied consensus hampered the military campaign with a time-consuming bombing
target approval process.  Another military rationale for having primarily U.S. forces
conduct operations against Iraq is that few other countries possess the military
capabilities (e.g., airborne refueling, air transport, precision guided munitions, and
night vision equipment) necessary to conduct a high-tech campaign designed to
achieve a swift victory with minimum Iraqi civilian and U.S. casualties.
Direct and Indirect Contributions.  An Administration official recently
stated that “a core group of eight nations ... has pledged either combat forces or
support units ... .”58  Britain, the only other country that has had warplanes patrolling
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the no-fly zones in Iraq, is expected to contribute up to 45,000 ground troops, as well
as air and naval forces.  Australia has deployed a combat task force, and it is believed
that other countries, such as Poland, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Romania, may
support coalition forces once a conflict begins.  The Czech Republic has reinforced
a contingent of anti-chemical weapons specialists in Kuwait, stationed there since
March 2002, and the Slovak parliament has approved the deployment of a similar
unit.  Japan, constitutionally barred from dispatching ground troops, reportedly may
also help in the disposal of chemical and biological weapons, and has recently
reinforced its fleet of naval vessels patrolling the Indian Ocean.59  Sweden and New
Zealand have indicated that they might contribute medical support. 
Other forms of support might prove valuable.  For example, countries have
granted overflight rights or back-fill for U.S. forces that might redeploy to Iraq from
Central Asia or the Balkans:  Canada is sending nearly 3,000 troops to Afghanistan,
freeing up U.S. soldiers for Iraq.  In addition, gaining permission to launch air strikes
from countries close to Iraq would reduce the need for mid-air refueling, allow
aircraft to re-arm sooner, and  enable planes to respond more quickly to ground force
calls for air strikes; Djibouti, Kuwait, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Romania, and Bulgaria
have offered the use of their airbases and seaports.  At the Bush Administration’s
request, the Hungarian government is allowing the use of an air base for the training
of up to 3,000 Iraqi opposition members to assist coalition forces as non-combatant
interpreters and administrators.60  
On January 15, the United States formally requested several measures of
assistance from the NATO allies, such as AWACS, refueling, and overflight
privileges; the request was deferred.  On February 10, France, Germany and Belgium
vetoed U.S. and Turkish requests to bolster Turkish defenses on the grounds that it
would implicitly endorse an attack on Iraq; German Chancellor Schroeder sought to
sharpen the distinction by announcing that his government would provide defensive
missiles and AWACS crews to help protect Turkey on a bilateral basis.61  A week
later, the impasse was broken by an agreement over language indicating that such
assistance “relates only to the defense of Turkey” and does not imply NATO support
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for a military operation against Iraq.62  Despite the compromise, many observers
believe the temporary rift may have lasting consequences for NATO.  
In addition, the Bush Administration asked permission of the Turkish
government to use Turkish bases and ports and to move American troops through
southeast Turkey to establish a northern front against Iraq – a key issue for U.S.
planners.  The negotiations over allowing U.S. troops  proceeded in tandem with
discussions over a U.S. aid package.63  The two sides apparently reached an
agreement permitting as many as 62,000 U.S. troops in Turkey; in return, the United
States  reportedly may provide approximately $6 billion in aid to Turkey.64  On
March 1, however, the  Turkish parliament by a 3-vote margin failed to approve the
deal.   The government has urged the United States to wait two weeks, after which
the legislature may reconsider the accord.  Some have criticized Turkey, claiming it
has leveraged U.S. strategic needs to squeeze a large aid package out of Washington.
However, Turkish officials argue that more than 90% of their country’s population
opposes a war and that Turkey suffered severe economic losses from the 1991 Gulf
War.  Ankara also is concerned over the possibility that a new conflict in Iraq could
re-kindle the efforts of Kurdish separatists.
In late February, Jordan’s prime minister acknowledged the presence of several
hundred U.S. military personnel on Jordanian soil; the troops were reportedly there
to operate Patriot missile defense systems and to conduct search-and-rescue missions;
the deployment marked a reversal from Jordan’s neutral stance during the 1991 Gulf
war.65  Although the Persian Gulf states generally oppose an attack on Iraq in public
statements, approximately 180,000 U.S. troops are currently ashore or on ships in the
region, and Saudi Arabia and Qatar host large U.S. military command centers.
Whether the United States will be permitted to use facilities in Saudi Arabia in
carrying out an attack on Iraq remains unclear.  U.S. troops based in Kuwait would
likely play a key role in any ground attack against Iraq.  In addition, several U.S.
aircraft carriers will be positioned in the region.
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Post-Conflict Assistance.  After the 1991 Gulf War, several nations –
notably Japan, Saudi Arabia and Germany – provided monetary contributions to
offset the costs of the conflict; it is not yet known if such would be the case after a
war against Iraq.  However, U.S. policymakers hope that several nations likely would
contribute to caring for refugees and to the post-war reconstruction of Iraq by
providing humanitarian assistance funding, programs for democratization, as well as
peacekeeping forces.  Japan, Sweden, and Romania have indicated that they might
play a role.
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime.
CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003.
Implications for the Middle East
Alfred B. Prados, 7-7626
(Last updated March 4, 2003)
A U.S.-led war against Iraq – depending on its intensity, duration, and
outcome– could have widespread effects on the broader Middle East. Demographic
pressures, stagnant economic growth, questions over political succession, and
festering regional disputes already raise many uncertainties regarding the future of
the Middle East. Although some have voiced fears that Iraq might fragment along
ethnic or sectarian lines as a by-product of such a war, a redrawing of regional
boundaries as occurred after World War I (and to a lesser extent World War II) is
highly unlikely; however, political realignments could take place, along with new
alliances and rivalries that might alter long-standing U.S. relationships in the region.
The opportunity to craft a new government and new institutions in Iraq might
increase U.S. influence over the course of events in the Middle East. Conversely,
U.S. military intervention could create a significant backlash against the United
States, particularly at the popular level, and regional governments might feel even
more constrained in accommodating U.S. policy goals. Governments that did decide
to support the U.S. effort would expect to be rewarded with financial assistance,
political support, or both. Saudi Arabia, for example, should it assent to U.S. use of
its bases or facilities, would be likely to push for political concessions, including a
stronger U.S. effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as a possible
reduction in U.S. military presence in the long term. (See below.)
The ability of the U.S. government to obtain the support or acquiescence of
Middle East governments and their citizens for a U.S.-led campaign against Iraq will
be a critical factor determining the effects of such a war on regional issues of interest
to the United States. These include democracy and governance, the protracted Arab-
Israeli peacemaking process, and security arrangements in the Gulf region. Two other
issues, terrorism and access to oil, are treated elsewhere in this report.
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Democracy and Governance.  Some commentators believe that a war with
Iraq culminating in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein would lead to a democratic
revolution in large parts of the Middle East. The Bush Administration itself has
repeatedly expressed support for the establishment of a more democratic order in the
Middle East, although skeptics point out that key U.S. allies in the region have
authoritarian regimes. Some link democracy in the Middle East with a broader effort
to pursue development in a region that has lagged behind much of the world in
economic and social development, as well as in individual freedom and political
empowerment. In a speech at the Heritage Foundation on December 12, 2002,
Secretary of State Colin Powell announced a three-pronged “Partnership for Peace”
initiative designed to enhance economic development, improve education, and build
institutions of civil society in the Middle East. Separately, Crown Prince Abdullah
of Saudi Arabia has reportedly proposed an “Arab Charter” that would encourage
wider political participation, economic integration, and mutual security measures.
Democratic reform in the Middle East, however, is likely to entail trade-offs and
compromises that may affect U.S. strategic plans in the region. Critics have often
charged that U.S. Middle Eastern policy is overly tolerant of autocratic or corrupt
regimes as long as they provide support for U.S. strategic or economic objectives in
the region. Some commentators imply that U.S. pursuit of democracy in the Middle
East is likely to be uneven, effectively creating an “exemption” from democracy for
key U.S. allies. Other critics argue that the minimal amount of assistance contained
in the Powell initiative ($29 million during the first year) reflects only a token effort
to support democratization and development, although the Administration is
requesting significantly more funding for this initiative–$145 million–in FY2004.
Arab reactions to the Powell initiative tended to be cool, some arguing that the
United States should deal with Arab-Israeli issues first. Still others fear that more
open political systems could lead to a takeover by Islamic fundamentalist groups,
who often constitute the most viable opposition in Middle East countries, or by other
groups whose goals might be inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, lack of prior
experience with democracy may inhibit the growth of democratic institutions in the
Middle East.
Arab-Israeli Peacemaking.  Administration officials and other
commentators argue that resolving the present crisis with Iraq will create a more
favorable climate for future initiatives to resume currently stalled Arab-Israeli peace
negotiations.  Proponents of this view cite the experience of the first Bush
Administration, which brought Arabs and Israelis together in a landmark peace
conference at Madrid in 1991, after first disposing of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait.
Many believe that the then Bush Administration secured wide Arab participation in
the coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait by promising a major post-war effort to
address the Arab-Israeli conflict. Officials of the present Bush Administration
continue to speak of their vision of pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement after
eliminating current threats from Iraq.  In a speech on February 26, 2003, President
Bush repeated earlier calls for a viable Palestinian state together with a commitment
on the part of all Arab states to live at peace with Israel.
Others believe that U.S. priorities should be reversed, arguing that the current
stalemate in Arab-Israeli negotiations, together with on-going violence between
Israelis and Palestinians, poses a greater potential threat to U.S. interests than a
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largely contained Iraq. They point out that support in the Middle East for a U.S.-led
coalition against Iraq is far weaker than it was in 1991, and cooperation from Arab
and Muslim states at best is likely to be limited and reluctant as long as Arab-Israeli
issues continue to fester. They warn that disillusionment over the present stalemate
in Arab-Israeli negotiations, combined with a war against Iraq, runs the risk of
inflaming popular opinion against the United States and encouraging an increase in
anti-U.S. terrorism.66
Security Arrangements in the Gulf Region.  Large-scale deployment of
U.S. troops to the Middle East to wage war against Iraq and the likelihood of a
continued major U.S. military presence in the region will exert added pressures on
Middle East governments to accommodate U.S. policies in the near term. Long-
lasting major U.S. military commitments in the region, however, could heighten
resentment against the United States from Islamic fundamentalists, nationalists, and
other groups opposed to a U.S. role in the Middle East; such resentment could
manifest itself in sporadic long-term terrorism directed against U.S. interests in the
region. Even friendly Middle East countries may eventually seek a reduction in U.S.
military presence.  According to a Washington Post report on February 9, 2003,
Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah plans to request the withdrawal of U.S. armed
forces from Saudi territory after Iraq has been disarmed.  U.S. and Saudi officials
declined to comment on this report, which an unnamed White House official
described as “hypothetical.”  At the same time, some friendly Middle East states,
particularly in Persian Gulf region, may prefer to continue relying on their bilateral
ties with the United States for long-term security guarantees.
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Background.  Since the end of the 1991 war with Iraq, surveys and studies
show a continuing decline in the health and nutrition status of the Iraqi civilian
population,  estimated at 24 million to 27 million,  especially among children and the
elderly.  But it is difficult to determine how much of the suffering is due to the
sanctions imposed on Iraq and how much is due to other factors.  Imposition of U.N.
sanctions followed a nearly decade-long war between Iraq and Iran, during which
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spending on the social welfare system declined.  Decades of conflict and the bombing
during the Gulf War damaged or destroyed much of the public infrastructure such as
water and sewage plants and many public buildings.  Some argue that supplies of
water, food, medicine, and electricity are a matter of urgent concern.67  However,
much of the information available on the conditions within Iraq is also considered
unreliable.  Some groups question the accuracy of statistics publicized by the
government, but have no independent sources of information.  All estimates of the
number of deaths due to lack of food or medical care vary widely based on the
source.  
U.N. and other humanitarian agencies provide aid to Iraq through the Oil-for-
Food Program (OFFP), which uses revenue from Iraqi oil sales to buy food and
medicines for the civilian population.68  Both bilateral and multilateral aid have
continued to flow into the country since the end of the war, although it is difficult to
assess the total amount provided by all donors outside the OFFP.  During the 1990s,
the OFFP alleviated some of the worst effects of the sanctions, but the humanitarian
situation (defined as urgent need for food, shelter, and basic health care) remains
serious and has continued to deteriorate over time.  Some improvements have been
seen in nutrition, health services, water supply and sanitation, but there is now greater
dependence on government services.  Health  and nutrition problems have been tied
to the consequences of war, sanctions, shortcomings of assistance, and the deliberate
policies of the Iraqi regime. 
War-Related Concerns.  The implications of war in Iraq include a potential
humanitarian emergency with population movements across borders or within Iraq
itself.  Four issues are of critical interest to Congress in that context.  First, how the
war will be fought and for how long; will it be a protracted, urban war with heavy
civilian casualties or a shorter war with less impact on the Iraqi people?  Second,
what type of humanitarian assistance will be provided to displaced populations (aid
priorities, use of oil revenues) and the role of other donors?  Third, how will
assistance programs be implemented – through U.S. occupation, U.N. administration,
or U.N./donor assistance?  Fourth, what will be the impact of refugee flows on
stability in the region? And finally, what will be the role of neighboring countries in
contributing to post-war efforts?  
On February 13, 2003, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan held a private
briefing for Security Council members on the likely humanitarian situation in Iraq in
the event of a war.  Afterward, the chief U.N. emergency relief coordinator, Kenzo
Oshima, told reporters that the United Nations expected that 600,000 to 1.45 million
refugees and asylum seekers might flee Iraq, that 2 million could become internally
displaced, and that 10 million inside Iraq would  require food assistance.69  Leaked
U.N. documents reportedly show that the organization is expecting 100,000
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immediate casualties in Iraq and increased risk to children due to malnutrition.70  The
United Nations is appealing for $120 million to prepare for post-war Iraqi relief and
has received pledges of about $30 million.  In addition to the United States, other
international donors are also responding to the U.N. request for support. 
U.N. agencies continue to reiterate that contingency planning does not mean
they have given up hope of avoiding war; at the same time, given the challenge of
current conditions in Iraq, these agencies also acknowledge that a conflict in Iraq
would disrupt critical infrastructure, delivery of basic services, and food distribution
with the potential of severe humanitarian consequences. Nevertheless, relief agencies
are having to plan for humanitarian needs amid great uncertainty about conditions in
the aftermath of conflict.
Refugee Preparations.  Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, and Kuwait have
publicly stated that they will prevent refugees from entering their countries.71 Iranian
leaders have stated that refugees will not be allowed over Iranian borders, but
refugees would be provided assistance in Iraq, which is a similar strategy used by Iran
in Afghanistan.72 However, Iran is also setting up 19 camps within its borders just in
case.  Turkey has said that it would prefer not to allow refugees over its borders and
is planning to build 13 camps in northern Iraq. However, Turkey is also planning five
more camps within its borders and has started preparations to build one camp of
24,000 tents. The Red Crescent team is making preparations to accommodate up to
100,000 people and treat up to 7,000 injured by bombs and fighting.73  Kuwait’s
government has said it will not let refugees enter the country from Iraq but that
displaced people could be cared for in the demilitarized border zone between the two
countries.  The government is also preparing to establish a camp for refugees.
According to relief agency officials, Jordanian  authorities appear determined not to
allow Iraqi refugees into Jordan.  Saudi Arabia has not publicly discussed the need
for preparation for refugees, but there have been reports that the government is
making some plans.74
Relief Planning.  The United Nations has an extensive infrastructure in Iraq
to oversee the OFFP,75 but expatriate staff would probably be withdrawn during a
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77 “U.S. Military Lays Out Postwar Iraq Plan,” Washington Post, February 12, 2003.
78 Transcript provided by Federal Document Clearing House.
conflict and would not be available to administer assistance while the fighting lasted.
Few nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have offices in Baghdad and only a
handful have a presence in Iraq.  The Iraqi regime restricts NGOs:  for example, those
that work in the North cannot have offices in the South.  In addition, U.S.-based
organizations are required by the U.S. government to have a license to operate in
Iraq.76  Within Iraq, relief agencies are stockpiling supplies of food, water, hygiene
packets, and medical supplies for approximately 250,000 people.
According to Pentagon planners, U.S. armed forces would initially take the lead
in relief and reconstruction, later turning to Iraqi ministries, NGOs, and international
organizations to assume some of the burden.77  The Department of Defense (DOD)
has set up an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian assistance as a central point
for those involved in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.  The group has
developed an operational concept for the delivery of aid, relief coordination, and a
transitional distribution system.  U.S. forces are pre-positioning food and relief aid
near Iraq and making plans to deal with a possible humanitarian crisis.  
DOD is taking an inter-agency approach to the potential need for humanitarian
assistance.  Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, told the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 11, 2003, that the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) and the Department of State were engaged with
working with NGOs and international organizations, which would be “important
partners in addressing Iraq’s humanitarian needs,” adding  “civilian and military
officials regularly consult and coordinate plans.”  With funding from USAID, U.S.
NGOs have formed a consortium, the Joint NGO Emergency Preparedness Initiative,
for better coordination.  Grossman noted that the United States had allocated  $15
million for planning, and $35 million was being made available from other
accounts.78 
Over the past several months, USAID has been putting a Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART) together and is making preparations to deal with the basic
needs of one million people.  There will be a core office in Kuwait City and three
mobile field offices.  Planning has included assembling and training the response
team, stockpiling emergency supplies and commodities, and communicating with
U.S. and international organizations.  According to USAID, so far it has spent $26
million from contingency planning funds.  Another $56 million will be drawn  from
existing funding sources within USAID.  The President is expected to make decisions
shortly on follow-on funding.
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Nonetheless, among relief organizations  there remains a concern that U.S. and
other military leaders have underestimated the potential humanitarian crisis in Iraq79
and that military planners have not developed adequate plans for dealing with that
crisis.  They complain that, despite U.S. statements to the contrary, they are not being
adequately consulted on relief plans and at present lack the resources to flow into Iraq
behind advancing U.S. forces, as projected by military planners.80  NGOs also
maintain that the U.S. government has  delayed approval of the  licenses required for
organizations not already present in Iraq to set up operations.81  Although the
humanitarian issues in Iraq have been getting more attention in recent weeks in the
United States, at the United Nations, and at international meetings such as the one
sponsored by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation in Geneva in mid-
February, the state of preparedness for humanitarian contingencies, degree of
transparency over planning, and lack of funding have many concerned about the
impact of war and capacity of the international community to meet the humanitarian
needs on the ground.
International and Domestic Legal Issues 
Relating to the Use of Force
Richard Grimmett 7-7675; David Ackerman 7-7965
(Last Updated, March 4, 2003)
The potential use of United States military force against Iraq necessarily raises
a number of domestic and  international legal issues – (1) its legality under Article
I, § 8, of the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution; (2) its legality under
international law if seen as a preemptive use of force; and (3) the effect of United
Nations Security Council resolutions on the matter.  The following subsections give
brief overviews of these issues and provide links to reports that discuss these matters
in greater detail.  
The Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.  The potential use
of military force by the United States against Iraq necessarily raises legal questions
under both the Constitution and the War Powers Resolution.  Article I, Section 8, of
the Constitution confers on Congress the power to “declare War”; and Congress has
employed this authority to enact both declarations of war and authorizations for the
use of force.  Article II of the Constitution, in turn, vests the “executive Power” of
the government in the President and designates him the “Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States ....”  Because of these separate powers, and
because of claims about the inherent authority that accrues to the President by virtue
of the existence of the United States as a sovereign nation, controversy has often
arisen about the extent to which the President may use military force without
congressional authorization.  While all commentators agree that the President has the
constitutional authority to defend the United States from sudden attack without
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congressional authorization, dispute still arises concerning whether, and the extent
to which, the use of offensive force in a given situation, such as may be contemplated
against Iraq, must be authorized by Congress in order to be constitutional. 
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) (P.L. 93-148), in turn, imposes specific
procedural mandates on the President’s use of military force. The WPR requires,
inter alia, that the President, in the absence of a declaration of war, file a report with
Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces “into hostilities or
situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances.”  Section 5(b) of the WPR then requires that the President terminate
the use of the armed forces within 60 days (90 days in certain circumstances) unless
Congress, in the interim, has declared war or adopted a specific authorization for the
continued use of force. The WPR also requires the President to “consult” with
Congress regarding uses of force. 
In the present circumstance these legal requirements seemingly have been met
and any controversy about the President’s unilateral use of force resolved.  As noted
earlier in this report, P.L. 107-243, signed into law on October 16, 2002, authorizes
the President “to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be
necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United
Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.”  As predicates for the use of
force, the statute requires the President to communicate to Congress his
determination that the use of diplomatic and other peaceful means will not
“adequately protect the United States ... or ... lead to enforcement of all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions” and that the use of force is “consistent”
with the battle against terrorism.
P.L. 107-243 also specifically states that it is “intended to constitute specific
statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers
Resolution” and requires the President to make periodic reports to Congress “on
matters relevant to this joint resolution.” The statute expresses congressional
“support” for the efforts of the President to obtain “prompt and decisive action by the
Security Council” to enforce Iraq’s compliance with all relevant Security Council
resolutions, but it does not condition the use of force on prior Security Council
authorization.  The authorization does not contain any time limitation.
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International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force.  In his speech to
the United Nations on September 12, 2002, President Bush described the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq as “a grave and gathering danger,” detailed that regime’s
persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and its persistent defiance
of numerous Security Council resolutions requiring Iraq to disarm, and raised the
specter of an “outlaw regime” providing such weapons to terrorists. In that speech
and others, the President has left little doubt that, with or without U.N. support, the
United States intends to act to force Iraq to disarm and otherwise abide by its past
commitments and that the U.S. may well use military force to accomplish that
objective.
Given that the United States has not itself been attacked by Iraq, one question
that arises is whether the unilateral use of force against Iraq by the United States
would be deemed legitimate under international law.  International law traditionally
has recognized the right of States to use force in self-defense, and that right continues
to be recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  That right has also traditionally
included the right to use force preemptively.  But to be recognized as legitimate,
preemption has had to meet two tests: (1) the perceived threat of attack has had to be
imminent, and (2) the means used have had to be  proportionate to the threat.
In the past the imminence of a threat has usually been readily apparent due to
the movement of enemy armed forces.  But the advent of terrorism, coupled with the
potential availability of weapons of mass destruction, has altered that equation.  As
a consequence, the legitimacy under international law of a preemptive attack on Iraq
by the United States, absent any Security Council authorization, may not, at the
outset, be readily determinable; and the circumstances eventually determined to
provide  justification for such an attack may shape what, in the future, is deemed to
be a lawful preemptive use of force.
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Security Council Authorization.  Prior to widespread adoption of the
Charter of the United Nations (U.N.), international law  recognized a nation’s use of
force against another nation as a matter of sovereign right.  But the Charter was
intended to change this legal situation.  The Charter states one of its purposes to be
“to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”  To that end it mandates
that its member states “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations” and that they
“settle their disputes by peaceful means ....”  It also creates a system of collective
security under Chapter VII to maintain and, if necessary, restore international peace
and security, effectuated through the Security Council.  While that system was often
frustrated by the Cold War, the Security Council has directed its member states to
impose economic sanctions in a number of situations and to use military force in such
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situations as Korea, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Balkans.  In addition, the
Charter in Article 51, as noted above, continues to recognize the “inherent right” of
States to use force in self-defense.
Whether further Security Council authorization is necessary to give U.N.
authority to the use of force against Iraq is debatable.  It is at least arguable that the
authorization the Council adopted in 1990 remains in effect.  In the wake of a number
of resolutions concerning Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait, Resolution 678,
adopted on November 29, 1990, authorized Member States “to use all necessary
means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant
resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area.”  In Resolution
687, adopted April 3, 1991, the Council set forth various requirements – including
unconditional Iraqi disarmament and unconditional Iraqi agreement not to develop
or acquire chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or facilities or components related
to them – as obligations that Iraq had to meet as conditions of the cease-fire.
Resolution 687 specifically reaffirmed  previous U.N. resolutions on Iraq, including
Resolution 678.  It can be contended, therefore, that a failure of Iraq to meet the
conditions set forth in Resolution 687 vitiates the cease-fire and brings the
authorization contained in Resolution 678 back into play.
Nonetheless, that may not be the view of a number of members of the Security
Council, and it remains a fact that the Council has not enacted any further explicit
authorization for the use of force against Iraq since 1990.  On November 8, 2002, in
the wake of President Bush’s challenging address to the United Nations a month
earlier, the Security Council did adopt Resolution 1441; and the focus now is on Iraqi
compliance with that resolution.  Resolution 1441 stated that Iraq was in “material
breach” of its obligations under earlier resolutions, imposed “an enhanced
inspections regime” in order to give Iraq “a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations,” and stated that Iraq would face “serious consequences” if
it continued to fail to meet its obligations.  The resolution obligates the Council to
“convene immediately” should Iraq interfere with the inspections regime or otherwise
fail to meet its disarmament obligations.  Whether Resolution 1441 necessitates an
additional resolution specifically authorizing the use of force appears debatable. The
Bush Administration has taken the position, however, that the United States is
prepared to take military action against Iraq to force its disarmament, even in the
absence of further authorization from the U.N. Security Council.
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Cost Issues
Stephen Daggett, 7-7642; Amy Belasco, 7-7627
(Last updated March 4, 2003)
Currently, the Defense Department is financing the mobilization of forces and
the deployment of equipment for a potential war with Iraq using regular FY2003
funding with costs of over $2.3 billion already incurred to activate reservists and
deploy and support troops and equipment in the region. Recently, controversy erupted
in Congress over the Administration’s unwillingness to  provide any estimates of the
cost of a war in Iraq at a time when press reports cited unofficial Pentagon estimates
of between $60 billion and $95 billion.82  In a hearing before the House Budget
Committee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz refused to provide any
estimate.83
Members of Congress have cited concern about the effect of war costs on the
deficit.  If  war costs reach $100 billion in the first year, the FY2003 deficit would
increase by one-third from about $300 billion to $400 billion, setting a new record
in real terms (i.e. when adjusted for inflation) though still a smaller percent of the
GDP than in 1983.84 The Administration may submit an FY2003 supplemental to
cover both the cost of a war with Iraq and additional funding for the cost of
Afghanistan and enhanced security at home in the next two weeks.  
 From press reports, it appears that the estimates of $60 to $100 billion include
not only the cost of a war with Iraq but also some occupation costs, possibly aid to
Allies as well as funds for Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism. (H.J.Res. 2,
the FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, included $10 billion to fund
DOD’s expenses in the first quarter of the year for DOD for Afghanistan and
enhanced security at home.)  Based on testimony by DOD’s Comptroller, Dov
Zakheim, DOD could request as much as an additional $12.8 billion to cover the cost
of Afghanistan and the global war on terrorism for the rest of the year.85 
The full costs of a war with Iraq could include not only the cost of the war itself
but also the cost of aid to allies to secure basing facilities and to compensate for
economic losses (e.g. Turkey, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and Jordan), post-war
occupation costs, reconstruction costs, and humanitarian assistance.  Post-war costs
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could be higher than the cost of the war itself, according to the estimates below.
Those estimates suggest that a  2-month war could cost between $27 billion and $60
billion, while the costs of aid to allies, occupation, reconstruction, and humanitarian
assistance could range between $35 billion and $69 billion  in the first year
depending on the size of the occupation force, the amount for aid to Allies, the scope
of humanitarian assistance, and the sharing of reconstruction aid  (see Table 1
below).
Table 1. Estimates of First Year Cost of a War with Iraq
(in billions of dollars )
Category Lower Enda Higher Endb
Two month war   26.9 59.8
    War Only Subtotal 26.9 59.8
Occupation Force 19.0 38.8
Reconstruction 5.0 10.0
Aid to Allies 10.0 18.0
Humanitarian aid 1.2 2.4
    War-related Subtotal 34.6 69.2
     Total 61.5 129.0
Notes and Sources:
a Lower end reflects CBO estimate of cost of a 270,000 force, a 10 month occupation of
100,000 troops, the U.S. paying half of the U.N.’s estimate of $30 billion for
reconstruction over three years, humanitarian aid for 10 % of the population, and $10
billion in aid to allies based on State Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times,
“Iraq War Cost Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” February 26, 2003. 
bHigher end estimate reflects House Budget Committee estimate of cost of a 250,000 force,
a 10-month occupation of 200,000 troops, the U.S. paying the full cost of
reconstruction, humanitarian aid for 20% of the population and $18 billion in aid to
allies based on State Department sources cited in Los Angeles Times, “Iraq War Cost
Could Soar, Pentagon Says,” February 26, 2003.
The Defense Department has not provided any official estimates of the potential
costs of a war with Iraq, although Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated in interviews
several weeks ago that $50 billion would be “on the high side.”86  The Office of
Management and Budget has prepared an internal estimate, which reportedly projects
costs of $50-60 billion, but it has not issued the estimate publicly, and it has not
explained the assumptions underlying its projections. An earlier estimate by former
chief White House economist Larry Lindsey of $100 billion to $200 billion was
dismissed by the Administration.
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War Costs.  Predicting the cost of a war is uncertain and would vary with the
size of the force deployed and the duration of the conflict.  Although most observers
predict that a war would be short, others predict that the war could last longer,
particularly if the U.S. encountered chemical or biological attacks, had to fight urban
warfare in Baghdad, or encountered more resistance than anticipated.
The Congressional Budget Office has published estimates of the costs of two
illustrative campaigns:  a heavy air option involving 250,000 troops deployed to the
region and heavy ground option involving 370,000 troops based on factors from the
individual services.  In a war that lasted two months, the heavy air option would cost
$27 billion and the heavy ground option would cost $36 billion for the war itself.87
Using a methodology based on the costs of the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the
Democratic staff of the House Budget Committee estimated that a two-month war
that deployed 250,000 troops would cost $53 billion to $60 billion, an estimate closer
to that used by Secretary Rumsfeld.88  A new estimate by the Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) that blends the two approaches, suggested that a two
month war would cost about $35 billion. A six-month war, with the same force size,
could cost substantially more,  ranging from $50 billion using CBO’s figures to $85
billion using CSBA’s approach.89  
Related Aid to Allies.  The cost of aid to allies to ensure access for U.S.
troops, as in the case of Turkey or to provide compensation for economic losses or
refugee costs, as in the case of Pakistan or Jordan and Egypt and Israel, is uncertain.
Discussions are reportedly underway. Press reports have mentioned requests from
allies of $15 billion in grants and loan guarantees from Turkey, $12 billion from
Israel, and major additions to current aid from Egypt and Jordan.90  Based on those
press reports, such aid to allies could add many billions to the cost of the war.  It is
not clear to what extent, if at all, estimates of those costs are included in the
Pentagon’s new overall estimate of $95 billion.  
Occupation.  The cost of a post-war occupation would vary depending on the
number of forces and the duration of their stay.  Using factors based on the recent
experience for peacekeepers, CBO estimated that monthly occupation costs would
range from $1.4 billion for 75,000 personnel to $3.8 billion for 200,000 personnel,
a force size that was considered by the U.S. Central Command.91  A year-long
occupation force of 100,000 troops would cost $22.8 billion and a force of 200,000
CRS-39
92 “A Huge Postwar Force Seen,” Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003.
93  Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Backgrounder.  CSBA uses the same
factors as CBO.
94 “U.N. Estimates rebuilding Iraq Will Cost $30 Billion.” New York Times, January 31,
2003.
95 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and
Alternatives, November 2002, p. 66-67; available online from the Academy’s web site at
[http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/War_with_Iraq.pdf].
96  CBO, Letter to Senator Kent Conrad and Congressman John M. Spratt, Jr, concerning
cots of a potential war with Iraq, September 30, 2002; see
 [ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/38xx/doc3822/09-30-Iraq.pdf].
troops would cost $45.6 billion using these factors.  That estimate was recently
buttressed by testimony from  the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric Shinseki, stating
his view that several hundred thousand troops could be needed initially.92  Under
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz recently disavowed this estimate, suggesting that a
smaller U.S. force was likely and that Allies would contribute as well. 
 An estimate by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has pegged
the post-war occupation  cost at $105 billion over 5 years, assuming an initial
peacekeeping force of 150,000 troops declining to 100,000 troops the second year
and 65,000 troops for the following 3 years.93 If the peacekeeping role were shared
with the U.N. or other nations, the costs to the U.S. would be lower. Press reports
suggest that the Administration is considering an occupation of about 2 years. 
Reconstruction.  According to United Nations agencies, the cost of
rebuilding Iraq after a war could run at least $30 billion in the first 3 years.94  Nobel
prize-winning economist William D. Nordhaus has indicated that reconstruction in
Iraq could cost between $30 billion over 3 to 4 years, based on World Bank factors,
to $75 billion over 6 years using the costs of the Marshall Plan as a proxy.95 
If Iraqi oil fields are not damaged, some observers have suggested that oil
revenues could pay for occupation or reconstruction.  Most of those revenues,
however,  are used for imports under the U.N. Oil for Food Program or for domestic
consumption.  Although expansion of Iraqi oil production may be possible over time,
additional revenues would not be available for some time.  The only additional
revenues available immediately might be those from the estimated  400,000 barrels
per day that Iraq currently smuggles and that generate about $3 billion a year.96  
Humanitarian Assistance.  Estimates of post-war humanitarian assistance
for emergency food and medical supplies have been estimated at about $2.5 billion
the first year, and $10 billion over 4 years, assuming that about 20% of Iraq’s
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population of 24 million needed help.97  If the number needing help were lower or
other nations or the U.N. contributed, the cost to the U.S. would be lower.  
Economic Repercussions.  Some observers have suggested that a war with
Iraq could lead to a spike in the cost of oil generated by a disruption in the supplies
that could, in turn, tip the economy into recession.  (See below, Oil Supply Issues)
Such a scenario could increase the cost to the U.S, economy substantially.  According
to recent press reports, however, the Saudis have promised to increase their
production to offset any potential shortfall caused by a drop or the cessation of Iraqi
oil production in the aftermath of a war.
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The threat of an armed conflict in Iraq raises concerns over its supply of crude
oil to world markets. The International Petroleum Encyclopedia 2001 reports that
Iraq held 112.5 billion barrels of proven crude oil reserves – 11% of the world’s
currently known reserves –  second only to Saudi Arabia’s 259 billion barrels.
Despite holding such large reserves, Iraq’s current rate of crude oil production is
much below its ultimate potential. With investment in technology and better
operating methods, Iraq could rank as a top producer, a development that could
change world oil market dynamics.
Under U.N. Resolution 986, the “oil for food” program, Iraq’s oil exports have
varied greatly; in some weeks virtually no oil has been exported, in others as much
as 3.0 million barrels per day (mbd) enter world markets. During the past two
months, the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program reports that exports have averaged 1.5
mbd under the oil-for-food program. In addition, Iraq likely supplies another 400,000
barrels to adjacent countries outside the U.N. run program. Despite the off-and-on
nature of Iraq’s international oil flow, the oil market relies on the Iraqi supply, and
it plays a role in the determination of crude oil prices and other supplier-purchaser
arrangements.
Iraq accounts for about 10% of average oil production by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iraq is an OPEC member but does not
participate in the cartel’s quota program (as do the 10 other members) because Iraqi
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exports are controlled by the U.N. under Resolution 986.  Iraq’s financial incentive
to keep supplying the world market is strong. Crude prices recently touched $40 per
barrel, the record levels from 1990-1991. The price spike resulted from supply
difficulties due to an oil workers’ strike in Venezuela, as well as overriding concerns
about Persian Gulf oil supply. The Venezuelan strike – which began on December
2, 2002 – appears at least partially resolved, although oil exports appear to be only
half pre-strike amounts.  
When and if pre-strike levels output will be reached is uncertain, as is the
longevity of oil workers return to work. Were the supply shortfall to continue through
spring – and events in the Persian Gulf cause a halt in Iraqi crude oil supply – OPEC
members would be hard pressed to make up the lost crude. With little surplus
producing capacity elsewhere in the world, a crude supply shortfall would likely
occur, and oil prices could spike above their recent $37 per barrel levels.  If any
conflict involving Iraq were to spread beyond its borders to Kuwait – as Saddam
Hussein has threatened – or affect tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf, a greater oil
shortfall could take place and cause a more significant impact on prices.
 On the other hand, should Iraq experience a  change of government, the country
could become a much larger oil producer, increasing world market supply, and
changing the oil price paradigm that has prevailed since the Iranian political upheaval
of 1978-79.  This eventuality could unleash a new set of political and economic
forces in the region.
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CRS Report RL31676, Middle East Oil Disruption: Potential Severity and Policy
Options.
Information Resources
This section provides links to additional sources of information related to a
possible war with Iraq.
CRS Experts
A list of CRS experts on Iraq-related issues may be found at 
[http://www.crs.gov/experts/iraqconflict.shtml].
Those listed include experts on U.S. policy towards Iraq, Iraqi threats, U.N. sanctions
and U.S. enforcement actions, policy options and implications, war powers and the
use of force, nation-building and exit strategies, and international views and roles.
Information research experts are also listed.
CRS Products 
For a list of CRS products related to the Iraq situation, see
[http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html].
CRS-42
The reports listed deal with threats, responses, and consequences; international and
regional issues and perspectives; and authorities and precedents for the use of force.
Chronology
For a chronology of Iraq related events since October 2002, see CRS Report
RL31667, Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: Chronology and Scheduled Events.
Iraq Facts 
For background information on Iraq, including geography, population, ethnic
divisions, government structure, and economic information, see the World Factbook,
2002 published by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
[http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html]
Maps
For basic maps related to the Iraq situation, see CRS Report RS21396, Iraq:
Map Sources.  The html version of the report includes hot links to a wide range of
map resources.
Reports, Studies, and Electronic Products
This CRS web page includes links to a wide range of sources relevant to the Iraq
confrontation. 
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter233.html].
The following CRS page focuses on official sources, including sources in both the
legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government, foreign government
sources, and sources of information at international organizations.
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/iraqdocs.shtml].
United Nations Resolutions
For the draft “second resolution” introduced by the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Spain on February 24, 2003, see
[http://www.un.int/usa/scdraft-iraq-2-24-03]
On November 8, 2002, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
adopted  Resolution 1441,  holding Iraq in “material breach” of its disarmament
obligations.  For background and text, see
[http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm]
For a compendium of resolutions since 1992, see CRS Report RL31611, Iraq-
Kuwait: United Nations Security Council Texts, 1992-2002.
